Terrorist groups - home based:
Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi:
aim(s): install Sharia in Libya
area(s) of operation: engages in frequent assassinations of security officials and political figures in the east, mostly in Benghazi; operates as a member of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, a coalition of jihadist groups combating the Libyan Ground Forces; on 11 September 2012, members participated in launching mortar attacks and ransackings at the US Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi that killed four people, including US Ambassador Christopher STEVENS; majority of members are Libyans and some are former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members
Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah:
aim(s): install Sharia in Libya
area(s) of operation: engages in frequent assassinations of security officials and political figures in the east, mostly in Darnah; operates as a member group of the Darnah Mujahidin Shura Council, a coalition of jihadist groups combating the Libyan Ground Forces; on 11 September 2012, members participated in launching mortar attacks and ransackings at the US Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi that killed four people, including US Ambassador Christopher STEVENS; majority of members are Libyans and some are former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya):
aim(s): prevent a unitary Libyan state from reconstituting, secure control over the country's critical resources and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya
area(s) of operation: based in Libya since circa 2015, with its original headquarters in Sirte; organized in the following Libya-based wilayats (provinces): Wilayat Tarabulus (west), Wilayat Barqa (northeast), and Wilayat Fezzan (southeast); ISIL-Libya no longer controls territory in Libya, but does maintain a low-profile presence throughout much of the country; was previously known before 2017 to have operated paramilitary training camps, collected taxes, directed religious education, broadcasted its messages on radio, and enforced its strict interpretation of Sharia; prior to Libyan Military forces and their foreign allies confronting ISIL-Libya, the group was assessed in 2016 to have had a growing presence with 1,000 of the 4,000-6,000 fighters based in Surt, a key oil exporting center, dedicated to taking control of oil fields to generate revenue; Libyan Government officials and Western allies collaborated to keep chemical weapons left over from the al-QADHAFI regime out of the group's reach; has engaged heavily in recruiting Libyan youth, including some from Colonel Muammar al-QADHAFI's tribe, and among his former army officers; current personnel strength is unknown
Terrorist groups - foreign based:
al-Mulathamun Battalion:
aim(s): replace regional governments, including Libya's transitional government, with an Islamic state
area(s) of operation: maintains an operational presence; engages heavily in kidnappings for ransom
al-Qa'ida (AQ):
aim(s): bolster networks in Libya and, ultimately, establish a pan-Islamic caliphate under a strict Salafi Muslim interpretation of Sharia
area(s) of operation: maintains a growing presence operating training camps and safehavens; stages attacks in Libya against Egypt and Tunisia
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM):
aim(s): replace Libya's transitional government with Sharia and, ultimately, establish a regional Islamic caliphate across all of North and West Africa
area(s) of operation: maintains an operational presence, primarily in the western and southern regions; centered mostly on kidnappings for ransom
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL):
aim(s): bolster its affiliate ISIL-Libya and enhance operational planning and logistics networks for staging attacks inside Tunisia
area(s) of operation: stages attacks in Libya against Tunisia along the Libya-Tunisia border; collaborates with its affiliate ISIL-Libya
Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC):
aim(s): enhance its networks in Libya and, ultimately, destroy the state of Israel
area(s) of operation: maintains limited networks for operational planning, logistics, transferring funds, and smuggling fighters and arms to be used against Israel; by 2017, the majority of veteran members had defected to join other groups